Aftermath of the Annapurna disaster

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Here is a thoughtful piece on the topic from the Earth Island Journal

Tragedy on the Annapurna Circuit

by Michael Dax – November 7, 2014

Introduction

Elsewhere I have written that “guides and porters are not necessary”. Of course this doesn’t mean that you cannot use them if you so desire or require, it just means that the Guerrilla Trek is perfectly amenable to independent trekkers. Personally that is how I prefer it. 

I had better state here that my one experience (out of 16 treks) with a guide and porters was 100% positive. But… and this is a big “but”, I chose the guide myself having observed him at work elsewhere, and I knew that we were going to trek through his village close to Makalu. I did not use an agency. He found and managed two stellar porters for us. in contrast I have also encountered several people (usually women trekking alone) whose experience has been, shall we say, unenviable. Proceed with caution and where possible make the most of personal recommendations.

This post addresses the recent (October, 2014) events in Nepal that may change all this.

In the immediate aftermath, and quite possibly just for media consumption the Nepali authorities (whatever that means exactly) said that they were going to make guides, porters and GPS tracking devices mandatory for all foreigners. This is of course useless, indeed dangerous, nonsense. 

As with most things in Nepal, there is a good chance that nothing will happen or that rules will be unevenly applied or bent to suit local circumstances. But I would like to give a bit of a heads up regarding possible changes in the “rules for trekking”. 

One of the plusses for this trek is that it is not subject to a Trekking Permit, park fees, or the outrageous TIMS card scam. Long may that last, just don’t count on it. 

If I become aware of a change I will try and update this post, but please do inform yourself before committing to a trekking holiday/journey in Nepal. If implemented as stated it would be the death of independent trekking in the country.

Summary

In October 2014 there were at least 43 deaths and many injuries on the Annapurna Circuit. The weather conditions that struck the region suddenly were actually known about well in advance. People were trekking in a place of significant danger at exactly the wrong time. They were there in large part because critical information was not made available.

Subsequently some did not survive the conditions in which they found themselves. This was due to one or more of several reasons: 

• Lack of vital information.
• Lack of appropriate gear and supplies
• Lack of facilities
• Poor or misleading advice
• Lack of experience and knowledge
• Avalanche

Mountains are stern teachers and there are always lessons to learn. 

#1 The individual has a responsibility to look after themselves and not place others in danger. 
#2 Agents in positions of trust have a responsibility to give sound advice untainted by commercial considerations. 
#3 The Government has a responsibility to provide appropriate regulation, resources and information from the funds they have received for the purpose.

At all three levels there is a responsibility to make the mountains a safer place to work, travel and explore. 

The proposals made in the immediate aftermath not only do not address the issues, but they are unrealistic, impracticable and expensive. At best they could only benefit the trekking agencies, and at worst they will destroy independent trekking in Nepal.

Background

Since doing this trek in April 2014 there has been a trekking disaster in the Annapurna region (specifically on the Thorung La - a pass of some 5400m). This briefly occupied headlines and the last death toll that I saw reported was 43, which would make it one of the worst in Nepal’s long history of mountain accidents of various sorts. And this figure does not include any bodies that may still lie buried under the snow. Nor does it include the many who will lose limbs or parts thereof.

This disaster is not in the same category as the one on Everest earlier in the year which killed 16 Sherpas. That was entirely due to a common but altogether less predictable event - an avalanche in the Everest Icefall. It involved well equipped, well trained and experienced people undertaking hazardous work in a very dangerous environment. The two should not be conflated or confused. They both carry risks and responsibilities, but do not involve the same hazards or carry the same level of risk. One is mountaineering, the other is trekking.

Cause

The primary cause of the disaster on the Annapurna Circuit was a severe weather system that crossed India over a two day period before slamming into the Himalaya and dumping a lot of snow accompanied by high winds and cold temperatures. An unusual event for that time of year but one which is naturally occurring and entirely forecastable. An event for which, apparently, some farmers in Nepal did indeed receive advance warning. It should not have lead to the loss of life, limb and livelihood that it did.

A secondary factor that made it worse is that this was peak trekking season. The weather is normally stable and good (that is one of the reasons it is peak season, but the word "normally" does not mean "always") and there were a lot of people high up crossing (or rather setting out to cross) the single high point on the Circuit. Some of these people were experienced hill walkers while others were complete novices. Some had guides and porters, and some were travelling independently.

The experienced do not necessarily go independently, nor do the inexperienced always have guides. And vice versa. That is usually a stylistic as well as financial decision.

These two factors together should not inevitably lead to a disaster of this magnitude. For that to happen others causes must come into play. 

Responsibility

The responsibility for it being as bad as it was lies at three levels

• The Government
• The Trekking Agencies
• The Individuals

The proportions for each of these three can be hotly debated, but what is unquestionable is the fact that many individuals were caught out on a high pass (5400m is about 600m higher than the top of Mt Blanc) in dreadful weather.

Many were ill-equipped, ill-prepared and inexperienced. They were also ill-informed and in some cases abandoned by people who they had paid and trusted to help them.

Some however were well prepared and knew what to do and importantly knew what NOT to do. These individuals survived, and in some cases may have helped others to survive.

Furthermore (and largely due to the greed of the Agencies) there are almost none of the Emergency facilities that one would find in Europe: No basic public shelters, almost no signposts, little or no way-marking, no mountain radios. 

Lastly there is no nation-wide system for informing the public (trekkers or locals) about impending weather conditions. Even two purely regional systems (Everest and Annapurna) would account for perhaps 95% of Trekkers and employed locals at risk, and presumably a similar proportion of trekking based income. 

The toll

Of these 43 confirmed deaths (at last count) about half were foreigners and half Nepalis. 

Behind these figures lie several questions:

As I understand it some of the Nepalis were local farmers who were caught in an avalanche elsewhere in the region. This is a sad consequence of life in the mountains, but not exactly relevant to policy regarding trekking. However it is very much relevant to improvements in weather warning systems. We may never know how many are in this category.

Incidentally, you have to suspect that if there had been no foreigners and only farmers were would barely have heard of this event. It was the presence of foreigners, some of whom may have had the ability to connect quickly with the outside world, who drew this to worldwide attention. This unfortunately feeds into a rather distorted picture of Nepal as just one disaster followed by another.

How many of the remaining Nepalis were guides, and how many were porters? 

The role of the former is to keep others out of danger while often the latter are drawn into danger by their work.

How many were guides (or porters) killed trying to rescue others, having first ensured the safety of their own clients?
How many of the foreigners who died were guided and how many independent? 
How many foreigners in each of the above categories were experienced and how many novices?
What information had each person received? And where did it come from?

We will probably never get clear answers to many of these questions, but some things are clear:

• At one point early on that day there were 43 people alive, the weather was fine, and a severe storm was known to be approaching. Known to many in the outside world that is, including a large swathe of India.
• At a later point on the same day many people were either dead or in need of rescue and hospitalisation.
• They left places of safety to go to places where they simply should not be at that time in that weather.
• They went there because either they did not have the advance warning they needed or they were told to ignore warning signs, or they lacked the experience to make their own judgments based on the available evidence.
• Once in an area of danger some people had the equipment and skills (and luck) to survive and others did not.

A bit of balance

Before looking at the reactions and proposed actions, let us just remember that not everyone who was involved died or was injured. Nor did everyone behave badly. A few did but many others behaved nobly, and some indeed died to save others. Perhaps these were people who failed to take adequate responsibility for themselves. In particular, some people were well equipped and took sensible actions while some guides, porters and individuals acted nobly and helped their clients or fellow trekkers

The Government Response

Instead of sensible responses and meaningful action there has been an all too predicable rush from the Authorities to put blame solely on “cheap trekkers without guides”. This is clearly an attempt to turn a disaster into a source of extra revenue for the Agencies. More unthinking regulation will do nothing to help yet this is what they propose. 

Government proposals

• Mandatory accredited guides
• Mandatory porters
• Mandatory GPS tracking devices

What these proposals ignore

All of these proposals add extra cost while delivering no benefit.

Guides and Porters

• These proposals ignore the fact that some who died were being guided while some who survived were either knowledgeable, experienced and well-equipped independent trekkers, or were people helped by them.
• It does not deal with the question of independent qualification of guides, which will undoubtedly be done under the auspices of the TAAN (Trekking Agencies Association of Nepal) who are the main culprits for many of the failings that resulted in this tragedy.
• It does not address the very real need to vet guides regarding sexual aggression towards or assaults of women trekkers.
• Having a porter makes no positive contribution to safety, indeed the reverse is true. More porters that are not part of properly constituted and equipped groups will inevitably translate into “more people who are ill-equipped and inadequately clothed high in the mountains”. As it stands some companies are notorious for failing to provide adequate gear to their porters.

GPS devices

• The vague term “GPS Tracking devices” does not appear to refer to GPS Navigation devices. The latter require some considerable skill to use safely, and the former do not help anyone to stay out of danger. 
• At best (and only if they are turned on, sufficiently charged, working properly and centrally monitored) "tracking devices" may enable rescuers to locate people. 
• Aside from the complex backend systems necessary to make them effective, they must also be purchased, stocked, maintained, repaired, charged and accompanied with instructions. 
• Or they must be carried by a trained guide. Any separation from the guide would then largely negate the utility of the device, which in a white-out is almost the first thing that would happen.
• Perhaps they meant PLBs which certainly have a role to play in the outdoors, but are only viable where there is a responsive rescue infrastructure in place (US, Europe, Australia, NZ).

These proposals are largely designed to cover up the complete failure of the Government to provide a weather warning system. Trekkers already pay significant sums both to the National Park from the ACAP fee and the Agencies from the TIMS card scam (even when travelling independently) and in return they get next to nothing.

Lessons

The reality of the situation is that not everyone trekking in these mountains is going to be a hard-core hiker or mountaineer with a wealth of experience back home. So the systems that are in place must be designed to cater to a wide range of skills and abilities. It is worth remembering that each year there are fatalities, some of them Nepali and some foreigners. There are always risks in mountains and high mountains often have higher risks.

Nepal does not have a hiking culture like Europe or the US. People walk the mountain trails certainly, but it is to get to their fields, to go from one village to another, to go to school, to attend festivals, to make a pilgrimage and to go to market. It is almost always only foreigners who have the leisure and resources to walk for pleasure without any specific purpose beyond the activity itself. This results in a different attitude towards risk, adventure and independence. 

Also, and crucially, there is an almost complete absence (outside the professional climbing and paragliding fraternity) of a safety culture. There are no or low standards in almost every area of life: transport (road and air), electricity, construction, healthcare, industry and workplaces. The lack of institutions to promote and enforce standards is part of being a third world country. It should therefore come as no surprise that this relaxed attitude is found in the mountains as well.


Avalanche

• In Europe, Alpine Club members often carry avalanche detection equipment in winter conditions, and we are taught how to use them. This is completely impractical in Nepal. The only way to avoid avalanche is not to be in an avalanche prone area at the wrong time.
• This requires local knowledge and trail management, with danger sections clearly marked (as is done in New Zealand), rerouted or even closed at times of extreme risk. Walking at low risk times of the day can also reduce the likelihood of accident, but not eliminate it entirely.

Information and preparation

• People need to be informed of inherent risks: Weather, Altitude, Cold, Navigation, Avalanche.
• People need to be informed of appropriate emergency procedures
• Timely accurate relevant information (especially as regards weather) is of paramount importance
• Minimal infrastructure can deliver vital information to a few key points
• Existing checkpoints do little for effective trail management or ensuring safety. They are strong on useless bureaucracy and weak on emergency response.
• Individuals need to make appropriate preparations based on the route and season and keep themselves informed along the way.

A focus on prevention

• Avoid having people going out into storms in the first place.Storms do not come out of nowhere, but they can come quickly and pass quickly.
• Enable people to find shelter.
  Rudimentary shelters at intervals on key passes. Poles and cairns along snow-covered sections of the route.
• People need to know safety procedures: what to do, where to go and when to stay put.
• Checkpoints to become primary information points.
  They should display trail status and condition, weather forecasts, and maps. They would enable people to check in and check out of each section easily by using their permit number for tracking.

Some simple precautions

A few precautions could have saved many lives and these fall into three categories: Information, Infrastructure and Individuals. 

Largely due to its lack of democratic, open and accountable institutions, both governmental and in civil society, Nepal is impoverished in the first two of these areas affecting both its own people as well as the foreigners who directly or indirectly bring in a sizeable proportion of the country's income. That is why any solutions need to be simple and low cost. 

Unfortunately every solution inevitably requires some maintenance and attention to detail, two areas where Nepal is often visibly lacking. One look at the state of some of the Swiss engineered and donated bridges will confirm this.

Simple low-cost procedures and facilities will do more than save lives. They will save the cost and dangers of massive rescue operations. Money and resources that could be well used elsewhere in Nepal - for example on healthcare and education for its women.


Information

• Ensuring that people understand the risks when venturing into the mountains is not easy (especially in the face of Agencies interests in exaggerating the need for a Guide and Porters).It is totally idealistic to hope everyone would first gain some experience elsewhere. That is never going to happen. Nor is passing a test to obtain a trekking permit. And to be fair let us not forget that many of us did some of our first walking on Nepal's trails with minimal gear, and very little knowledge. 
• However a basic information sheet can highlight effective measures to take in preparation, what to do and where to go in case of emergency.A sheet with some good information is indeed provided at the tourist office in Pokhara. This could be upgraded a little to include Weather Emergency Procedures. People receiving their permits should have this information drawn to their attention, both by personnel and by posters and notice boards.
• The distribution of reliable, authoritative information on weather conditions for specific regions is clearly a government responsibility. It should be available for everyone living in the mountains. 
• This information should be available and published openly to individuals, businesses and at check points in key locations (7 would be entirely sufficient) along the trail.
• On the trail a “traffic light” system (Green=Ok, Yellow=Proceed with caution to next point, Red=Stop here or Go back - depending on location) would be easy to understand and implement, even in a country that has almost no traffic lights. 

Infrastructure

• A radio connection at Manang, Thorung Phedi, High Pass and Muktinath would allow adverse weather conditions to be relayed quickly as well as helping to track people and call for support. This should be in addition to mobile phone networks and wifi spots. 
• Daily notice boards with the weather forecast at lodges and checkpoints. Regular daily updates would help develop good habits of consistency.
• Rock walls in a curve even if open to the sky provide significant respite from the wind and only cost a few hours of labour.
  Half a dozen of these on the Thorung La would have helped especially if people had actually stayed in them rather than being led to their deaths by unscrupulous "guides". 
• Poles of sufficient height and close enough together to be seen on some sections of trail. These should also be clearly numbered to correspond with a map (on your information  sheet) so people know exactly where they are in relation to the next emergency shelter and other infrastructure.
  Cairns can also form part of the guidance system, there are plenty of rocks, but hi-visibility orange poles are essential. 

The cost of all this is probably less than a few hours of helicopter flying time. 


Individuals

• Everyone needs to understand the risks they take and be properly prepared, whether they are along or in a self-guided group or an organised commercial group.
• Individuals need to inform themselves properly and invest more in clothing and footwear. 
• Individuals have to take personal responsibility not just to look after themselves and those dependent on them, but also to minimise the calls they may have to make on the goodwill, skills and resources of their rescuers. For this they require trustworthy information. 

Waiting out bad weather

• Information, Infrastructure and Individuals intersect at this point. You need to know that bad weather is coming, quickly reach (or remain in) a shelter, look after yourself and adapt your plans.
• Waiting out weather is generally easier for individuals than groups with guides and porters. There are fewer people to gather and consult, lower overhead costs, and fewer or no bookings to rearrange. Groups generally try and stay together and run to a timetable. Individuals can be more flexible.

Regulation

• If there is a role anywhere for further regulation it would be in the area of accreditation of Agencies, Guides and Porters.
  As well as the conditions under which the latter work there should also be an emphasis on their training and vetting. Lots of luck with that one. 
• In the absence of anything better, a recommendation from a friend who had a good experience or a warning from someone who had a bad experience (for example on TripAdvisor) is a useful precaution.

The outcome

One can only hope that none of the Government’s proposals will ever see the light of day or if they do never be applied widely and fail promptly.

In the worst case scenario it would be “game over” for independent trekking in Nepal and I for one would simply go elsewhere, which is easy enough for me as I have already done most of the main treks several times. 

But it would be a disaster for regions that are still trying to develop new routes and more generally for all independently-minded people who want to explore our shared planet on their own.

It would add costs without adding to safety or awareness. Responsibilities that should lie with each individual would be passed on to guides who often lack basic training and equipment. 

Even if the numbers of trekkers stayed the same, the total numbers of people on some trails would significantly increase (imagine every two people being accompanied by two others) with a resulting negative impact on the environment (toilets, trash, erosion, fuel).

Anyway assuming that none of this applies to this particular region then my comments elsewhere on the plusses of this trek are still valid. If not, then all bets are off. 

Best of luck!